Raymond HV Gallucci
Retired, 8956 Amelung St., Frederick, MD 21704, USA.

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Journal : Civil Engineering Journal

Risk-Deformed Regulation: What Went Wrong with NFPA 805 Raymond HV Gallucci
Civil Engineering Journal Vol 4, No 12 (2018): December
Publisher : Salehan Institute of Higher Education

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (1316.891 KB) | DOI: 10.28991/cej-03091205

Abstract

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 was incorporated into Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations to allow commercial nuclear plants to transition their existing, deterministic fire protection licensing bases to ones that are “performance-based and risk-informed.”  Both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the commercial reactor industry championed this major leap forward in “risk-informed regulation.”  However, hidden behind all the “success” are compromises and manipulations that were necessary to make this “work,” as revealed in this article.  It is written by a former employee of the NRC (views do not nor ever did represent an official position), the first to receive a PhD on a thesis specifically related to fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear plants, and later hired in 2003 as the expert in fire PRA for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).  He participated in the NFPA-805 program from the start in 2005 until mid-2014.  The perspectives here cover that time period, with some extended time specific to issues that the interested reader can find detailed in “Risk-Deformed Regulation:  What Went Wrong with NFPA 805” http://vixra.org/pdf/  (access latest version of entry 1805.0403).NFPA 805 will have been “successful” in that adopting plants are as safe as or safer than before, at a minimum having at least become more knowledgeable of potential safety weaknesses.  Plants that made effective changes will be safer than before, although “effective” conveys that some changes only may have “seemingly” reduced risk.  If such changes were prompted by questionable risk-reduction credits such as those cited later in this paper, then perhaps actual risk-reduction changes that could have been made were not.  At worst, the plant merely missed an opportunity to become “safer,” a consequence of the problems with “risk-deformed regulation.”
Risk-Reduction Credit for Very Early Warning Fire Detection at Nuclear Power Plants: From FAQ to Fiction Raymond HV Gallucci
Civil Engineering Journal Vol 5, No 2 (2019): February
Publisher : Salehan Institute of Higher Education

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (834.238 KB) | DOI: 10.28991/cej-2019-03091246

Abstract

In 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), with support from the commercial nuclear power industry, adopted the 2001 Edition of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,” as the means by which commercial nuclear power licensees could comply with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.48(c), to replace deterministic fire protection licensing bases with ones that are risk-informed and performance-based.  To facilitate licensee “transitions” to the new licensing bases via NFPA 805, a “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs) program, established early during the pilot-plant phase, was expanded to enable use of consensus technical “short-cuts” for fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods.  These “Fire PRA FAQs” enabled licensees, with NRC approval, to bypass more traditional means of establishing acceptable PRA method enhancements on an interim basis, pending eventual confirmation by test programs and/or more detailed analyses.  The NRC approved several, of which perhaps the most substantial in providing risk reduction benefits was FAQ 08-0046 on “Incipient Fire Detection Systems,” more accurately characterized as “Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems” (VEWFDSs).  Controversial from the start, the hidden story behind this FAQ’s initial adoption is relevant to examination of the NRC NUREG report that later replaced it and remains in effect today.  This article examines this backstory, tracing recommendations that were proposed and bypassed, then examines alternatives to the current guidance.  These alternatives, which maximize possible risk reduction credit for VEWFDSs at nuclear power plants, remain at least a factor of two less than the current peak NUREG-2180 risk-reduction factor even before the latter accounts for the possibility of fire pre-emption altogether.