Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi dan Bisnis
Vol 14 No 2 (2019)

Mampukah Corporate Governance Mengurangi Eksekutif Risk Taker Melakukan Penghindaran Pajak?

Naniek Noviari (Universitas Udayana)
I Gusti Ngurah Agung Suaryana (Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis, Universitas Udayana)



Article Info

Publish Date
24 May 2019

Abstract

Taxpayers will try to pay the smallest possible tax. One way to reduce taxes is to engage in tax avoidance actions commonly referred to as tax avoidance. One of the causes of this behavior is the presence of an executive character who dares to take risks. The impact of the executive character on tax resignation can be reduced by the implementation of good corporate governance. This research proposes the application of good corporate governance to reduce the impact of an executive character on aggressive tax actions. The population of this study comprises of all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014–2016. Sampling was done using purposive sampling. 48 observations were picked as the samples. This study involved one independent variable (executive characteristics), one dependent variable (aggressive tax action), and one corporate governance variable. The study used moderated regression analysis. This study found the more aggressive the executive character, the higher the probability of the tax avoidance. Better implementation of good corporate governance results in lower the tax avoidance action. Better implementation of good corporate governance also weakens the influence of the executive character on tax avoidance actions. Keywords: tax avoidance, executive characteristics, good corporate governance

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Journal Info

Abbrev

jiab

Publisher

Subject

Economics, Econometrics & Finance

Description

JIAB exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control ...