Ostrom’s Design Principles as Steering Principles for Contractual Governance in “Hotbeds”

Taufik Haryanto (PhD candidate at Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands)
Josephine van Zeben (Chair of the LAW group at Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands)
Kai Purnhagen (Chaired Professor of Food Law at Faculty of Life Science and Faculty of Law, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany)

Forest and Society
Vol. 6 No. 1 (2022): APRIL

The sustainability of complex contractual governance in “hotbeds” depends on steering principles. Ostrom’s design principles provide an analytical framework for robust institutions that enable collective action and cooperative behaviour. The success of Ostrom’s design principles depends on the capacity of social entities to self-govern. This article explores the potential of Ostrom’s design principles as such steering principles for contractual governance in “hotbeds”. We find that the preconditions for successful contractual networks in “hotbeds” and the empirical situations underlying Ostrom’s design principles are comparable. Building on this comparability, we apply Ostrom’s design principles to contractual networks in “hotbeds” area theoretically, and then go on to demonstrate its applied value to three situations in West Papua, Indonesia.