E-JURNAL AKUNTANSI
Vol 35 No 2 (2025)

Pengendalian Konflik Agensi dalam Tahapan Investasi pada Startup dengan Pendanaan Modal Ventura

Ratih Mustikoningsih (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia, Indonesia)
Budi Frensidy (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia, Indonesia)



Article Info

Publish Date
15 Dec 2024

Abstract

This research aims to manage agency conflicts such as information asymmetry and moral hazard that occur during the pre-investment to post-investment phases. During the investment process, Venture Capital acts as the principal, while Startups act as the agents. This study employs a qualitative method with a case study approach. The research subjects consist of one (1) Startup in the financial technology (fintech) sector and two (2) Venture Capital firms, one owned by a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) and the other privately owned. The findings indicate that managing agency conflicts between Venture Capital and Startups requires comprehensive pre-investment assessments, including initial selection that covers financial and non-financial aspects, as well as contractual agreements involving a due diligence process. Meanwhile, post-investment management is carried out through performance monitoring, staged funding, and forming a Venture Capital Syndicate. Keywords: Agency Conflict; Moral Hazard; Information Asymmetry; Venture Capital; Startup.

Copyrights © 2025






Journal Info

Abbrev

akuntansi

Publisher

Subject

Economics, Econometrics & Finance

Description

E-Jurnal Akuntansi covered various research approaches, namely: quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method. E-Jurnal Akuntansi focuses related on various themes, topics and aspects of accounting and investment, including (but not limited) to the following topics: Financial Accounting Managerial ...