<![CDATA[Research aims: This research aims to test the moderating effect of monitoring agents on the effect of the founder-board of directors (founder-BOD) and family-board of directors (family-BOD) on firm performance. Monitoring agents are represented by independent directors and commissioners. In this case, the age, size, and industrial type of the firms are the control variables.Design/Methodology/Approach: This quantitative research employed secondary data from 489 firms registered in the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2022. In this case, the observation data were 2,445, which were tested using a panel regression method. Research findings: Hypothesis test results show that monitoring agents strengthen the negative effect of founder-BOD on firm performance. Another result shows that family-BOD does not have a significant effect on firm performance, and monitoring agents do not show a moderating effect on the relationship. Theoretical contribution/Originality: This research provides new insights into the role of monitoring agents within Indonesia's two-tier governance system, enhancing our understanding of corporate governance in emerging economies. It offers a novel perspective on how independent directors and commissioners influence firm performance, contributing to the literature on corporate governance. Practitioner/Policy implication: The findings underscore the importance of enhancing the independence and effectiveness of monitoring agents to improve firm governance. These insights are relevant for policymakers and corporate governance reforms in Indonesia and similar emerging economies.Research limitation/Implication: Further research could consider the quality of monitoring agents, such as regulation, culture, social relationships, and knowledge.]]>
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