<![CDATA[This study analyzes the consolidation of oligarchic power within Indonesia’s mining governance by examining how politicians who own or are affiliated with mining companies influence public policy. Their dual position as state officials and business actors enables direct intervention in legislative processes, licensing decisions, and the formulation of strategic regulations, including the 2020 revision of the Mineral and Coal Law. Using a qualitative library research design, this study synthesizes academic literature, civil society reports, and policy documents to identify patterns of politico business alliances, patronage networks, and regulatory capture within the mining sector. The findings reveal that politician miners serve as pivotal actors in shaping permissive regulatory frameworks, centralizing licensing authority, and sustaining electoral transactions that secure long term corporate interests. This dynamic illustrates a form of state capture in which public authority is steered toward protecting elite economic coalitions rather than promoting transparency, accountability, or distributive justice. The study contributes to the ongoing debate on oligarchic entrenchment in post authoritarian Indonesia by highlighting the mechanisms through which political access is converted into economic advantage and vice versa. Strengthening mining governance therefore requires comprehensive reforms, including conflict of interest safeguards, transparent ownership and licensing disclosures, and stricter oversight institutions. Keywords: Oligarchy, Politician Miners, Mining Governance, state capture, Public Policy]]>
Copyrights © 2025
