<![CDATA[This article examines the authority and legitimacy of armed violence in Islamic law and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) through a case study of the Houthi attacks, to clarify who is entitled to use force and under what normative conditions. Employing a qualitative doctrinal and comparative legal approach, the study analyses primary legal sources, including IHL instruments and classical and contemporary Islamic legal scholarship. It is complemented by secondary literature on non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The findings demonstrate a fundamental distinction between the two frameworks: IHL adopts a neutral, regulatory approach that applies equally to all parties in armed conflict, including NSAGs, whereas Islamic law conditions the permissibility of violence on legitimate authority (wilāyah) and ethical justification grounded in maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah, particularly the protection of life (ḥifẓ al-nafs). While both frameworks converge in regulating the conduct of hostilities, including the protection of civilians and the principle of proportionality, they diverge significantly in their conceptions of legitimacy. This study argues that Islamic law does not merely regulate violence but embeds it within a broader moral and humanitarian framework that prioritises the preservation of human life and restricts the use of force beyond formal legality. The implications of these findings contribute to contemporary debates on the role of NSAGs, offering a legitimacy-based comparative model that bridges legal and ethical analysis. This model provides a novel contribution by integrating doctrinal comparison with Islamic humanitarian ethics, thereby advancing interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of Sharia, international law, and the ethics of warfare.]]>
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