This study aims to analyze the potential restriction of freedom of expression through Article 240 paragraph (1) and Article 241 paragraph (1) of Law Number 1 of 2023 concerning the Criminal Code within the perspective of a democratic rule of law. The research focuses on the potential criminalization of public criticism due to the vague and multi-interpretative nature of the defamation provisions, which fail to provide clear boundaries between legitimate criticism and punishable insult. This research employs a normative legal research method using both statute and conceptual approaches. Data collection was conducted through library research utilizing primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials, which were analyzed qualitatively. The findings indicate that Article 240 paragraph (1) and Article 241 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code have the potential to restrict freedom of expression because the term “insult” is subjective, elastic, and open to multiple interpretations. Although the new Criminal Code has transformed the offense into a complaint-based offense and reduced criminal sanctions, the substance of the provisions still creates opportunities for the criminalization of critical expression and causes a chilling effect within democratic life. From the perspective of legal politics, these provisions reflect a paradox between protecting the dignity of state institutions and guaranteeing freedom of expression as a constitutional right within a democratic rule of law.
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