Abstrak. Keberhasilan pengelolaan keuangan desa bergantung pada partisipasi pemangku kepentingan, ketersediaan informasi, dan etika kerja dalam penyusunan anggaran. Namun, penganggaran desa masih rentan terhadap senjangan anggaran akibat partisipasi anggaran yang tinggi dan asimetri informasi. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh partisipasi anggaran dan asimetri informasi terhadap senjangan anggaran dengan etika kerja sebagai variabel moderasi pada pemerintahan desa di Kecamatan Cisayong, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif dengan teknik purposive sampling terhadap 70 responden, terdiri atas kepala desa dan anggota BPD. Data dikumpulkan melalui kuesioner skala Likert, diubah menjadi data interval menggunakan Metode Successive Interval (MSI), kemudian dianalisis menggunakan Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) pada IBM SPSS 29. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan partisipasi anggaran berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap senjangan anggaran (t=2,486; p=0,015), asimetri informasi juga berpengaruh positif dan signifikan (t=5,662; p<0,001), sedangkan model menjelaskan 57,9% variasi senjangan anggaran. Abstract. The success of village financial management depends on stakeholder participation, information availability, and work ethics throughout the budgeting process. However, village budgeting remains vulnerable to budgetary slack due to extensive budget participation and information asymmetry. This study examines the effects of budget participation and information asymmetry on budgetary slack, with work ethics as a moderating variable, in village governments in Cisayong District, Tasikmalaya Regency. A quantitative approach was employed using purposive sampling involving 70 respondents consisting of village heads and Village Consultative Body (BPD) members. Data were collected through Likert-scale questionnaires, transformed into interval data using the Method of Successive Intervals (MSI), and analyzed using Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) with IBM SPSS 29. The results indicate that budget participation positively and significantly affects budgetary slack (t=2.486; p=0.015), while information asymmetry also has a positive and significant effect (t=5.662; p<0.001). The moderation model explains 57.9% of the variance in budgetary slack.
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