The principle of Nemo Judex Idoneus In Propria Causa, which prohibits an individual from acting as a judge in a case involving their own interests, serves as a fundamental foundation for ensuring the independence and impartiality of the Constitutional Court, which stands at the forefront of constitutional oversight in Indonesia. This study aims to critically examine the application of this principle within the institutional practices of the Constitutional Court, adopting a critical approach to normative, structural, and implementational aspects. The analysis begins with a review of relevant legislation, legal doctrines, and case studies that illustrate potential conflicts of interest capable of undermining public trust in the Constitutional Court. The findings indicate a disparity between the normative acknowledgment of the Nemo Judex Idoneus In Propria Causa principle and its practical realities, particularly in the trial and decision-making processes of constitutional judges, which remain vulnerable to external influences. As a strategic measure, this study recommends the establishment of an independent supervisory mechanism and reforms to the oversight system to optimize the implementation of the Nemo Judex Idoneus In Propria Causa principle. By offering a critical perspective, this study aspires to make a significant contribution to strengthening the discourse of constitutional law grounded in the principles of justice and independence.
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