<![CDATA[This study examines the House of Representatives' (DPR) oversight of the follow-up to findings by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK). The study focuses on the legal regulations that form the basis for oversight and the factors influencing its effective implementation. The method used is normative juridical research with a statutory, conceptual, and case-based approach. The results indicate that although the DPR has constitutional legitimacy to carry out its oversight function, its implementation of follow-up to BPK findings has not been optimal. This is due to various obstacles, such as weak enforcement of sanctions, limited institutional capacity, the influence of political interests, and a lack of synergy between the DPR and BPK. Furthermore, the lack of detailed technical regulations and low compliance of audited entities also reduce the effectiveness of oversight. Therefore, strengthening regulatory aspects, improving institutional quality, and improving coordination are needed to promote accountability in state financial management.]]>
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