<![CDATA[This study examines two main research questions: (1) how the dominance of multiparty coalitions emerges in the House of Representatives (DPR), and (2) how such dominance affects the independence of the oversight function. The research employs a doctrinal legal method with conceptual and statutory approaches, supported by a literature review of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. The analysis is conducted descriptively. The findings indicate that the dominance of multiparty coalitions is a consequence of party fragmentation and the need for stability within a presidential system, which encourages the formation of oversized coalitions. However, this condition weakens the independence of the DPR in exercising its oversight function. Transactional relationships between political parties and the government, particularly through the distribution of cabinet positions, lead party factions to adopt more compromising and less critical stances toward executive policies. As a result, the system of checks and balances does not function optimally, and the DPR risks shifting from an oversight body into a legitimizing instrument of government policies. This study concludes that the dominance of multiparty coalitions has significant implications for the quality of democracy and governance in Indonesia.]]>
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