<![CDATA[This article examines the problem of politicization in the fit and proper test mechanism conducted by the House of Representatives (DPR) in the selection of election management bodies, where the DPR acts as the final decision-maker, thereby creating potential conflicts of interest. In response, two reform models have emerged: reverse mechanism selection (RMS), which transfers final selection authority to an independent selection committee, and the Election Bill proposed by civil society, which abolishes the fit and proper test and replaces it with a limited confirmation mechanism by the DPR. This study aims to: first, explain the problem of politicization in the fit and proper test; second, analyze the designs of RMS and the proposed Election Bill in addressing politicization; and third, compare both models. This research employs a doctrinal legal method with statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches. The findings indicate that: first, the fit and proper test no longer functions as an objective evaluation mechanism but is influenced by political interests; second, RMS shifts final authority to the selection committee, while the proposed Election Bill removes the fit and proper test; third, both models do not eliminate politicization but rather shift it to different actors and stages.]]>
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