<![CDATA[This research aims to analyze the effectiveness of the supervisory function of the House of Representatives (DPR RI) over the Investment Management Agency, Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), from a constitutional law perspective. Danantara is established as a state investment management entity with characteristics of a sovereign wealth fund, managing assets of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), including dividends that contribute to non-tax state revenue within the State Budget (APBN).The main issue addressed in this research is the absence of explicit legal provisions regulating the involvement of DPR in supervising Danantara. Although Danantara has an internal supervisory mechanism as stipulated in Government Regulation Number 10 of 2025, external legislative oversight by DPR is not clearly defined. This condition creates a normative gap in legislative supervision and has the potential to weaken the principle of Checks and Balances within the Indonesian constitutional system. This study employs a normative legal method with statutory and conceptual approaches. The findings indicate the need for stronger regulatory frameworks that explicitly involve DPR in supervising Danantara to ensure transparency and accountability in state asset management. Therefore, this research recommends establishing clear legislative oversight mechanisms and enhancing public information disclosure as part of good governance principles.]]>
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