<![CDATA[This article examines the oversight function of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) through the lens of game theory. It argues that the failure of parliamentary oversight is not only a moral deficiency of individual legislators, but rather an institutional design failure that renders non-oversight the rational choice for legislators. Employing normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and analytical approaches, and drawing upon the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action, McCubbins and Schwartz’s police patrols versus fire alarms framework, and Robert Axelrod’s repeated game theory, this article maps the incentive structures faced by DPR members. The findings reveal that the costs of exercising oversight, including the risk of losing coalition access, party support, and reelection prospects, consistently outweigh its benefits for individual legislators. The article recommends institutional redesign that alters the payoff matrix, including the adoption of minority inquiry rights modeled after the German Grundgesetz, the strengthening of fire alarm mechanisms through civil society empowerment, and the enhancement of the DPR’s research capacity.]]>
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