<![CDATA[This study examines the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight by the House of Representatives (DPR) over political party financial assistance within the context of Indonesia’s multiparty system following the 2024 legislative election. The study focuses on two main issues: how the multiparty configuration affects the effectiveness of DPR oversight and how structural conflicts of interest and regulatory design contribute to weak accountability in the use of public funds by political parties. This research employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. Primary legal materials consist of legislation concerning DPR oversight functions and political party financing, while secondary materials include scholarly journals, books, and relevant official documents. The findings indicate that a multiparty system does not automatically weaken oversight; however, in the Indonesian post-2024 legislative election context, political configurations that encourage pragmatic coalitions reduce substantive opposition. Furthermore, the DPR faces structural conflicts of interest because it politically represents parties that are themselves recipients of public funding. In addition, the regulatory framework remains oriented toward administrative compliance rather than substantive accountability based on outcome evaluation. Therefore, weak oversight is primarily caused by institutional and regulatory design flaws rather than merely the number of political parties.]]>
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