<![CDATA[This study examines the extent to which the nuclear deterrence strategy formulated by John M. Collins was effective when applied in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, as well as how the event prompted changes in the global arms control system and international collective security approaches. Using historical qualitative methods-including an examination of policy documents, official speeches, and behind-the-scenes negotiation processes-this study outlines the five main components of Collins' version of nuclear strategy: deterrence, flexible response, command control, arms control, and war termination. The research findings emphasize that successful deterrence relies heavily on the credibility of the nuclear threat as well as the effectiveness of crisis communications, including the use of hotlines between Washington and Moscow and back-channel diplomacy. The thirteen-day crisis also triggered the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), which laid the foundation for the subsequent arms control regime. The study concludes that sustaining strategic stability requires a reliable deterrence strategy underpinned by a robust command structure and diplomatic mechanisms.]]>
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