This comprehensive study analyzes the performance and security of three distinct cryptographic algorithms, namely AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, and Lightweight-PDAC, for securing Google Forms examination links. A quantitative experimental method combined with a multi-criteria survey mapping (MCDM) was employed using a robust framework encompassing benchmarks (encryption time, decryption time, memory consumption, ciphertext size, and Shannon entropy), OWASP Risk Assessment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis. The final scoring mechanism, which heavily integrated survey weights gathered from 20 diverse respondents including IT teachers, CBT administrators, and IT practitioners, reveals that Lightweight-PDAC achieved the highest final score of 0.9901. In comparison, ChaCha20-Poly1305 and AES-GCM achieved scores of 0.4924 and 0.4620, respectively. These significant findings strongly recommend Lightweight-PDAC as a highly efficient and balanced cryptographic solution for securing examination links, particularly on heterogeneous student devices with limited computational resources.
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