Abstract: This research examines parliament's role in supervising executive emergency powers, comparing Indonesia’s presidential system with the United Kingdom’s parliamentary model. Grounded in debates on emergency constitutional law and parliamentary sovereignty, this normative legal research uses a comparative approach to analyse constitutional frameworks and legislative structures. Data were collected through a comprehensive literature review of secondary materials, including relevant emergency statutes. The findings show that Indonesia relies on a codified model in which the President has unilateral authority to issue Perpu based on subjective urgency, delaying DPR scrutiny to a retrospective stage. Conversely, the UK operates under parliamentary supremacy, utilising the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and fast-track legislation to enforce immediate ex-ante oversight. In conclusion, the structural differences show that a presidential system with a dominant executive coalition carries a higher risk of turning legislative oversight into a symbolic rubber stamp during crises. Keywords: Parliament, Executive. Emergency Power
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