<![CDATA[The 2020-2024 reform of the Indonesian National Police (Polri), despite its focus on instrumental improvements, is widely deemed unsystematic and ineffective in enhancing public trust and accountability. This failure is underscored by low public trust and the incompletion of approximately 50% of 580,000 public complaints. This article argues that the stagnation of reform is not due to a lack of internal initiatives but stems from a permanent structural weakness in the external oversight mechanism, the National Police Commission (Kompolnas). Employing an Institutional Policy Analysis (IPA) and normative-empirical legal research, this study finds that Polri's centralized command structure and strong esprit de corps render self-reform prone to conflicts of interest. Consequently, Kompolnas's current authority, limited to non-binding recommendations, is insufficient. The primary novelty of this research is the proposition of a 2025 Legislative Reform: a fundamental revision of the Police Law to transform Kompolnas into an oversight body with legally binding executive authority, thereby creating an effective institutional counterbalance to ensure accountability.]]>
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