This study examined whether neuroevidence could alter the juridical classification of homicide in Islamic criminal law. It used a non-empirical qualitative design based on a focused narrative conceptual review of Islamic criminal-law scholarship on intentional homicide, quasi-intentional homicide, accidental killing, criminal intent, and responsibility, together with selected neurolaw and neuroscience literature on volition, executive control, and neurocognitive impairment. The analysis clarified the relevant concepts, compared the two literatures, and interpreted the juridical significance of neuroevidence. It found that intentional homicide, quasi-intentional homicide, and accidental killing did not form a neurological continuum and that executive-control impairment did not itself negate homicidal intent. Brain findings also remained separated from the offender's historical mental state by a substantial inferential gap. The study proposed a four-level model distinguishing capacity, intention, act classification, and penal consequence. It concluded that neuroevidence could contribute to reclassification only indirectly when tied to a doctrinally relevant proposition, while quasi-intentional homicide should not become a residual category for impaired control.
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