This research examines the legal antinomy between the absolute execution rights of secured creditors under Article 55 paragraph (1) of the Bankruptcy Law and the unity of bankruptcy principle within Limited Liability Companies. This normative clash triggers systemic issues because unilateral core asset withdrawal by financial institutions destroys the corporate going concern value and violates distributive justice for unsecured creditors. Utilizing normative legal research with conceptual, statutory, and comparative approaches to corporate rescue regulations in Singapore and Malaysia, this study finds that these comparative jurisdictions successfully mitigate secured creditor hegemony through judicial moratoriums and public interest exceptions. Therefore, this article recommends a normative synchronization through the reinterpretation of secured rights from absolute physical control into strict financial priority over liquidation proceeds. This transformation necessitates expanding the discretionary authority of the Supervisory Judge to precisely suspend core asset execution, ensuring optimal value maximization of the bankruptcy estate for all participating creditors.
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