This article aims to analyze the constitutional limits of freedom of expression in the phenomenon of publicly disclosing alleged infidelity on social media (“spill aib perselingkuhan”), which, as a conceptual construction developed in this study, may shift into a form of digital vigilantism. The research questions addressed are, first, the constitutional status of this practice as an exercise of freedom of expression, and second, its constitutional limits when it shifts into a form of collective social punishment that threatens the honour and dignity of others. This study employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The primary legal materials consist of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 1 of 2024, Constitutional Court Decision Number 78/PUU-XXI/2023, and Supreme Court Decision Number 2387 K/Pid.Sus/2020, supported by secondary legal materials such as books, journal articles, and prior research, analyzed qualitatively through a constitutional balancing approach. The findings show that the disclosure of personal experience remains constitutionally protected as an exercise of freedom of expression so long as it does not identify third parties or mobilize social punishment. As a result of conceptual analysis—rather than a category explicitly regulated by statute—this study finds that the practice shifts into digital vigilantism when three cumulative elements are met: identification of another party, mobilization of public punishment, and an actual impact in the form of cyberbullying, doxing, or online shaming; restrictions on such expression must therefore satisfy the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. The novelty of this study lies in a three-category spectrum model (protected expression, expression potentially infringing the rights of others, and digital vigilantism) that has not been developed in prior studies, which generally examine freedom of expression and digital vigilantism separately.
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