Pemodelan Risiko dan Upaya Mitigasi Serangan Route Hijacking Terhadap Sistem Informasi Akademik Kampus Dengan RPKI: Risk Modeling and Mitigation Efforts for Route Hijacking Attacks on a Campus Academic Information System Using RPKI

Raja Hafiza Ramanda Putra (Universitas Riau)
Linna Oktaviana Sari (Universitas Riau)

CSRID
Vol 18 No 3 (2026): Oktober 2026

Route hijacking attacks on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) pose a serious threat to the reliability of campus Academic Information System services. One common form is route origin change, where an unauthorized Autonomous System (AS) announces IP prefixes belonging to another party. This study aims to model the risk and analyze its impact on service availability. The methodology uses a routing topology model involving internal, transit, external, and attacker routers in a controlled environment. The results show that prefixes announced by unauthorized ASes can be accepted and replace valid routes due to the lack of origin validation, causing traffic to be misdirected. This condition creates risks such as traffic redirection, credential theft, and reduced service reliability. As a mitigation effort, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is implemented through Route Origin Authorization (ROA) and Route Origin Validation (ROV), which effectively reject invalid routes and ensure traffic remains on legitimate paths.