Under Indonesian Company Law, public shareholders' legal position during corporate insolvency and liquidation is highly precarious. Currently, shareholders effectively act as unsecured creditors with the lowest priority, relying solely on residual bankruptcy estates after all senior obligations are fulfilled. Employing a normative legal research method, this study analyzes the legal vulnerabilities of public shareholders facing company dissolution. The analysis evaluates key statutory provisions—specifically Articles 52, 142, and 150—which dictate that shareholders acquire 'creditor' status only upon liquidation and may even face judicial clawbacks of distributed funds to satisfy unpaid debts. Ultimately, this research finds that treating passive retail public shareholders the same as active controlling shareholders is fundamentally inequitable. The study concludes that this uniform treatment as unsecured creditors violates the principles of distributive justice, highlighting the need for a more nuanced legal framework to protect retail investors.
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