The 1965 violence marked a critical turning point in Indonesian political history, reshaping the relationship among Islam, communism, and the military and influencing the subsequent configuration of state power. This study examines how the relationship among these three forces developed before and after 1965 and how these transformations contributed to the consolidation of militarism under the New Order and affected the political position of Islamic groups. Employing a literature-based qualitative approach, the study analyzes relevant historical documents and scholarly works published in academic journals. The findings demonstrate that the 1965 violence provided a crucial political context for the military to expand and consolidate its political authority through anti-communist discourse while simultaneously restructuring relations between the state and Islamic groups. The suppression of communism did not result in a corresponding strengthening of Islamic politics; instead, Islamic political activities remained subject to sustained state control. The study concludes that the 1965 violence should be understood not only as a historical tragedy but also as a formative political rupture that contributed to the construction of New Order power structures and ideological relations, and to the subsequent trajectory of Indonesian politics.
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