The principle of checks and balances is a fundamental instrument in the Indonesian constitutional system after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution to prevent the concentration of power in the executive institution (executive heavy). However, in practice in 2026, this function is often hampered by dynamic political realities. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of the horizontal supervision mechanism between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President in the framework of the presidential system in Indonesia, especially in the midst of the influence of the dominance of political party coalitions. The research method used is normative jurisprudence with a legislative approach and a conceptual approach. The results of the study show that constitutionally, the House of Representatives has been equipped with strong supervisory instruments through legislative, budget, and constitutional rights such as the right to interpellation and the right of inquiry. However, the implementation of these rights has been weakened due to the phenomenon of political dominance of the legislature which places the legislature under the umbrella of executive strategic interests. This causes the supervisory mechanism to be a mere formality and lose its critical power. The contribution of this research lies in mapping the sociopolitical impact on the doctrine of separation of powers in Indonesia and providing a new perspective on the urgency of repositioning the role of the opposition in strengthening the presidential system. This study concludes that strengthening the principle of checks and balances not only requires a strict rule of law, but also requires the independence of political parties to prevent the return of authoritarianism. As a recommendation, it is necessary to strengthen the internal rules of parliament to guarantee the rights of minorities in carrying out supervisory functions without obstacles from the dominance of large coalitions.
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