Money laundering derived from corruption may involve political parties when illicit assets are received, controlled, or used through their organizational structures. The legal issue arises from the status of political parties as legal entities (rechtspersoon) and the absence of clear parameters for attributing money laundering conduct to the organization rather than solely to individual members or officials. This research examines the position of political parties as corporations in the money laundering regime and formulates a justice-based model of criminal liability. It employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and limited comparative approaches. The findings show that criminal liability may be attributed to a political party when there is a demonstrable institutional connection between the conduct of its organs, the flow and use of illicit assets, and the interests of the organization. Such attribution is assessed through institutional benefit, the use of organizational structures or facilities, and failure of prevention or internal control. A justice-based model therefore requires a clear distinction between personal and institutional liability, accompanied by proportionate sanctions focusing on asset recovery and the strengthening of internal compliance.
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