Pre-order transactions create a temporal separation between payment and delivery, generating structural uncertainty within contractual relationships. This study re-examines the allocation of risk in such arrangements through a comparative analysis of Baiʿ al-Salam in the Hanafi school particularly the jurisprudence of Abū Ḥanīfa and John Maynard Keynes’s theory of fundamental uncertainty. While Islamic jurisprudence addresses future contingencies through ex ante contractual precision grounded in legal certainty (yaqīn) and moral accountability (amanah), Keynes emphasizes the inherent unpredictability of economic life and the limits of probabilistic reasoning. Employing qualitative library research and thematic content analysis of classical Hanafi sources alongside Keynes’s principal writings, this research constructs a conceptual dialogue rather than a doctrinal synthesis. The findings demonstrate that Abū Ḥanīfa mitigates transactional risk through strict contractual specification aimed at safeguarding fairness and protecting vulnerable parties, whereas Keynes proposes institutional mechanisms to stabilize expectations under radical uncertainty. Integrating these perspectives produces an ethically grounded model of risk governance that combines contractual clarity with institutional responsibility. This framework contributes to contemporary discourse on Islamic finance, uncertainty management, and the moral regulation of markets.
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