Economic democracy, as enshrined in Article 33 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, serves as the Constitutional foundation for managing the national economy to achieve public welfare. However, disparities in natural resource revenue-sharing and fiscal transfers indicate that its implementation has not yet realized equitable economic development. This study examines the original intent of economic democracy during the 1999–2002 Constitutional amendments, analyzes how the Constitutional Court interprets the concept through its judicial decisions, and assesses the implications of that interpretation for regulating natural resource revenue-sharing. This research uses normative legal research and employs statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, drawing on Constitutional documents, legislation, Constitutional Court decisions, and relevant legal literature. The findings show that the Constitutional Court consistently adopts an originalist interpretation by linking economic democracy to the principles of togetherness, social justice, state control, and public welfare. Nevertheless, the Court's interpretation remains abstract and functions merely as a general Constitutional guideline without providing measurable standards for determining equitable fiscal distribution. As a result, regulation of natural resource revenue-sharing remains largely dependent on legislative and executive discretion, creating legal uncertainty and persistent regional inequality. The study concludes that a more specific Constitutional interpretation of economic democracy is necessary to strengthen Constitutional guidance for fiscal policy and ensure greater distributive justice in Indonesia
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