This study examined how HIV/AIDS was constructed as a national and international security threat and assessed whether the resulting security claims were proportionate to the available empirical evidence. A qualitative document-review design was used, combining purposive literature selection with critical content analysis of policy documents, United Nations materials, global health reports, and peer-reviewed research. The analysis operationalized securitization through the identification of securitizing actors, referent objects, audiences, threat claims, and policy consequences. The findings showed that the security framing of HIV/AIDS was driven particularly by concerns about state stability, military readiness, and peacekeeping operations. However, the empirical relationship between HIV/AIDS and state failure or international insecurity was indirect, context-dependent, and frequently mediated by poverty, conflict, governance capacity, and health-system resilience. Securitization increased political attention and resources, but it also risked threat inflation, stigma, and policy displacement. The study concluded that security considerations should remain subordinate to evidence-based, rights-sensitive, and public-health-oriented HIV policy.
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