<![CDATA[Free electoral choice is constitutionally protected in Indonesia, but clientelism complicates the legal meaning of that protection. This article examined how election law should distinguish unlawful inducement from broader clientelistic relations without treating every social influence as coercion. It used normative legal research through constitutional, statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, reading Article 22E and popular sovereignty together with Law No. 7 of 2017, Article 25 of the ICCPR, General Comment No. 25, and relevant Constitutional Court decisions. The analysis found that ballot secrecy protected the act of voting, while free choice also required independent formation of electoral will. Direct inducement could be prohibited without proof of how the recipient voted. Use of public authority required evidence that a lawful resource had been converted into partisan advantage in a legally significant manner. Challenges to election results required a separate assessment of the seriousness and electoral consequence of the conduct. Social-science evidence clarified mechanisms of pressure, but legal consequences depended on the type of electoral wrong and the proof appropriate to it.]]>
Copyrights © 2026
