Plea bargaining is increasingly considered as an instrument for improving efficiency in criminal justice, yet its application to corruption cases raises a fundamental question concerning the recovery of public assets. This study aims to formulate an asset-recovery-based plea-bargaining model for corruption cases in Indonesia. Using normative legal research through statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches, this study examines the Indonesian legal framework and plea-bargaining arrangements in the United States, Germany, and Malaysia. The analysis demonstrates that plea bargaining should not be designed merely as a mechanism for accelerating case resolution or reducing sentences. Its novelty lies in positioning verified asset recovery as a substantive prerequisite for obtaining any negotiated legal benefit. Based on this proposition, the study formulates a five-stage model consisting of: (1) voluntary confession and asset disclosure; (2) prosecutor verification of the confession, evidence, and disclosed assets; (3) public interest assessment based on measurable recovery and investigative cooperation; (4) judicial oversight of voluntariness, evidentiary sufficiency, proportionality, and public-interest justification; and (5) an asset recovery-biased sentence proportionate to the verified cooperation and recovery achieved. The model establishes a controlled relationship between cooperation and legal benefit while preventing plea bargaining from becoming an unconditional sentence discount. It provides a corruption-specific framework for integrating negotiated criminal proceedings with asset recovery, due process, and judicial accountability in Indonesia.
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