This research is motivated by the issue of constitutional omission in the testing of laws that have a different character from the testing of ordinary norms because the problem arises from the absence or incompleteness of regulation, thus giving rise to a gap in the form of uncertainty in the limits of the authority of the Constitutional Court (MK) between what is regulated and what should be regulated. This research aims to examine constitutional omission as well as formulate the limits of the authority of the Constitutional Court as a negative legislator. The research method used is normative juridical with a legislative, conceptual, and case approach to the Constitutional Court Decision Number 10/PUU-VI/2008, 100/PUU-XIII/2015, 183/PUU-XXII/2024, 158/PUU-XXIV/2026, as well as Main Decision Number 261/PUU-XXIII/2025. The results of the study show two tendencies of the Constitutional Court's practice, namely the recognition of the absence of material as a constitutional issue and judicial restraint on the issue of implementation or the choice of law-making policies. The novelty of this research lies in the formulation of explicit parameters to distinguish constitutional omissions that are worthy of examination from mere legal voids which are issues of implementation or legal policy.
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