This article examines the conditions for moving from fine-tuning evidence to rational acceptance of theism in public justification. It uses argumentative analysis of selected literature, Bayesian reconstruction, and evaluation of objections and replies. Its principal target is the confirmatory core restated by Donahue, rather than a presumed demand for universal agreement by all fine-tuning advocates. The analysis shows that a likelihood advantage increases relative odds, whereas accepting theism requires additional justification concerning priors, competing hypotheses, and acceptance rules. Assessments of divine purposes and observer selection identify where these additional commitments enter. The article proposes accessibility, defensibility, and robustness criteria proportionate to the conclusion claimed. It concludes that the confirmatory core alone does not establish obligatory acceptance of theism, while allowing substantial evidential support. Its contribution is a map of justificatory burdens for evaluating cosmological arguments in religious epistemology without treating disagreement as evidence of failure.
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