<![CDATA[Research Aim: This study examines the principal–agent relationship between the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi) and the national news agency LKBN ANTARA in the Press Public Service Obligation (PSO), a state-funded news programme worth IDR 176–181 billion a year: how agency problems arise in practice, and what keeps the relationship intact. Design/Methods/Approach: A qualitative case study tracing the full 2025 PSO cycle through official documents (2022–2025) and interviews with the Komdigi PSO unit and ANTARA's PSO coordinator, analysed thematically. Research Finding: Two classic agency problems appear: conflicting incentives (the ministry pursues the public's right to information; ANTARA, a state-owned enterprise, must also earn profit) and information asymmetry (ANTARA holds cost and production data the ministry cannot fully verify). In 2025 the ministerial decree and contract were only issued in July while production had run since January. Three binding factors contain the problems: a clear legal framework, cost-plus compensation with an agreed 6.5% margin paid only for verified products, and verification and monitoring routines that the agent internalises down to the newsroom. Theoretical Contribution/Originality: The study moves below the governance level of earlier work on this PSO to show how the output compliance–outcome gap is produced: per-product verification tied to payment makes the agent optimise pass rates, while relational mechanisms, not market incentives, hold the relationship together. Practitioner/Policy Implication: Earlier decrees, indicators beyond output volume, and shared real-time data would reduce both problems. Research Limitation: A single case with few elite informants. Findings transfer to similar government–SOE PSO arrangements rather than generalise.]]>
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