The parliamentary threshold has become one of the most debated electoral mechanisms in Indonesia's post-Reform constitutional development because of its implications for party system design, democratic representation, and governmental stability. Although previous studies have examined parliamentary thresholds from legal and electoral perspectives, limited attention has been given to their broader constitutional implications within Indonesia's presidential system. This study addresses this gap by analysing the constitutional role of the parliamentary threshold and proposing a balanced constitutional framework for its future development. Employing normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, comparative, and case approaches, the study analyses constitutional provisions, electoral legislation, Constitutional Court decisions, and comparative constitutional scholarship. The findings indicate that the parliamentary threshold has reduced legislative fragmentation and strengthened governmental stability, but it also raises constitutional concerns regarding political representation, electoral equality, and democratic legitimacy. As its principal novelty, this study develops an integrated constitutional framework based on proportionality, representative democracy, and constitutional equality to evaluate parliamentary threshold regulation. Constitutionally, it argues that parliamentary thresholds should function as adaptive constitutional instruments rather than fixed electoral rules. From a policy perspective, the study recommends periodic evidence-based evaluation of threshold levels to ensure that future electoral reforms promote both effective governance and democratic inclusiveness in Indonesia.
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