This study examines the effect of board of commissioners size and the number of independent commissioners on tax avoidance, analyzing audit quality as a moderating variable. The sample consists of 476 firm-year observations from non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (2017–2023), selected through purposive sampling. Using panel data regression (Common Effect Model), tax avoidance is measured by the Current Effective Tax Rate (CETR), and audit quality by the natural logarithm of audit fees. Results show that larger boards and more independent commissioners increase CETR, indicating lower tax avoidance. High audit quality also directly reduces tax avoidance. However, as a moderator, audit quality weakens the impact of the board and independent commissioners on tax avoidance. Robustness tests using ETR confirm these findings. Ultimately, the study concludes that internal and external monitoring mechanisms operate as substitutes rather than complements in mitigating corporate tax avoidance.
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