A correct answer on a translation-matching task provides limited evidence about a learner's ability to use an expression in a new situation. This conceptual-philosophical study draws on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to examine what warrants the claim that a Mandarin learner understands a word. It separates the adequacy of a lexical counterpart for a given task, the learner's performance on that task, and the grounds for attributing understanding beyond the observed performance. Wittgenstein's account is examined alongside Messick's and Kane's theories of assessment validity and Li's (2018) validation study of L2 Chinese pragmatic comprehension. Hypothetical cases involving cuan, koko/cici, and bakpao/包子 probe the limits of moving from form–meaning matching to grammatical and socially appropriate use. The analysis argues that claims of understanding require explicit criteria of use and evidence relevant to the target activity. Its contribution is a conceptual clarification that can inform the construction of assessment inferences; it proposes neither a new theory of translation equivalence nor a validated test. No learner data were collected, and the proposed pedagogical implications await empirical examination.
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