This study examines the conceptual boundaries of the phrase “compelling reasons” (or “urgent reasons”) in marriage dispensation as the central issue in determining whether deviations from the legal age requirement for marriage may still be justified within the framework of child protection and legal certainty. The issue is significant because the ambiguous meaning of the phrase may broaden the scope of exceptions, generate multiple interpretations, and ultimately weaken the function of age restrictions in the family law system. This is a normative legal study that draws on primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials to identify the meaning, limits, and interpretive direction of the phrase in the practice of marriage law. The study finds that “compelling reasons” should not be understood merely as ordinary social grounds or family pressure, but rather as an extraordinary circumstance in which no other reasonable option remains, and it must be assessed in close relation to the best interests of the child, adequate evidence, and the objectives of legal protection. The novelty of this article lies in its affirmation that the conceptual boundary of compelling reasons must be placed within its nature as an emergency instrument that is valid only when applied restrictively, so that marriage dispensation remains an exceptional mechanism and does not become a means of normalizing child marriage. The implication of this study is the importance of establishing clearer and more measurable normative parameters so that the application of marriage dispensation becomes more consistent, legal certainty is better ensured, and child protection remains the primary orientation.
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