The doctrine of kasb is commonly presented as the Ashʿarī middle path between Jabarī determinism and Muʿtazilī autonomy. Two matters, however, are rarely examined in Indonesian scholarship: the Qur'anic grounding of the term itself, and the principal objection that a created power which is not muʾaththira cannot ground moral responsibility, an objection summarised as jabr khafī, or concealed determinism. This article examines the formulation of kasb in the primary works of al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, and al-Rāzī, and tests it against that objection, with al-Māturīdī's doctrine of istiṭāʿa as the Sunni comparison. The analysis addresses three parameters: the status of human qudra, the ground of taklīf, and the consequence for divine justice. Three findings emerge. First, kasb is a Qur'anic term, and the distinction between kasabat and iktasabat in QS al-Baqara: 286 supplies a lexical foundation that the secondary literature has largely overlooked. Second, the five theologians do not speak with one voice: al-Juwaynī moves towards granting human power genuine efficacy, al-Ghazālī reformulates the question through habitual concomitance, and al-Rāzī moves markedly towards determinism. Third, the objection of jabr khafī cannot be dismissed, and the Ashʿarī answer holds only once the ground of responsibility is relocated from causal efficacy to volitional attribution. The article therefore argues that kasb is better described as a limited rather than a complete solution.
Copyrights © 2026