Indonesia's third and fourth amendments to its State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Law, namely Law No. 1 of 2025 and Law No. 16 of 2025, deleted the phrase "separated state wealth" from the statutory definition of SOEs and declared, in the new Article 4B, that SOE profits and losses belong to the SOE rather than the state. This article examines that paradigm shift through the lens of Indonesian company-law doctrine on separate legal personality and comparative practice in state-owned enterprise and sovereign-wealth-fund governance. Using normative legal research combining statutory, conceptual, case, and comparative approaches, the article argues that the reform conflates two analytically distinct questions, namely protecting directors' good-faith business judgment from automatic corruption liability and removing SOE capital from the constitutional scope of state-finance oversight. Drawing on the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, China's SASAC model, and the governance arrangements of Temasek Holdings and Khazanah Nasional, the article finds that Indonesia's redesign of the Supreme Audit Board's examination authority into a discretionary, parliament-gated mechanism departs from comparative best practice and leaves the constitutionality of Article 4B formally untested after the Constitutional Court dismissed pending material-review petitions on procedural rather than substantive grounds.
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