<![CDATA[This article examines the meaning of qiwāmah in Qur’an 4:34 through a critical reading informed by Jürgen Habermas’s theories of ideology critique, communicative action, and discourse ethics. Using a qualitative library-based approach, the study compares the interpretations of six exegetes—al-Ṭabarī, al-Rāzī, al-Qurṭubī, al-Jalālayn, al-Zuḥaylī, and Quraish Shihab—with particular attention to the two clauses concerning divine preference and financial responsibility. It then applies Habermas’s validity claims to the arguments of al-Rāzī and al-Ṭabarī. The findings show that although the transmission of the Qur’anic text is definitive (qaṭʿī al-thubūt), the meaning and scope of qiwāmah remain open to interpretation. Al-Rāzī’s argument, which associates male authority with presumed superior capacities, is insufficient to establish a universal basis for authority. Al-Ṭabarī’s interpretation, which emphasizes financial obligations, offers a more defensible but conditional justification, although the relationship between the two causal clauses requires further clarification. The study argues that qiwāmah may be understood as a responsibility linked to specific obligations rather than an unrestricted privilege. Any renegotiation of marital responsibilities, however, must consider the textual grounds of qiwāmah, the conditions of equitable participation, and the objectives of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah concerning family welfare and justice.]]>
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