Jurnal Aplikasi Bisnis
Volume 11 Nomor 9, September 2011

Pengaruh Informasi Asimetrik Terhadap Masalah Agency Kontraktual dalam Pembiayaan Mudharabah

Nur Fauziah (Unknown)
Nur Syakdiyyah (Unknown)



Article Info

Publish Date
13 Mar 2017

Abstract

This study analyzed the influence of Asymmetric Infonnation of the Contractual Agenty Problems in Mudharahah. Asymmetric information in this study was based on the form of adverse selection and moral hazard. Moral hazard is an aberration that cannot be observed by Shahibul Maal. Negative actions or activities of the entrepreneur (mudharib) are not known by Shahibul Maal so that mudharib can freely act without the knowledge of them. Adverse selection associated with the ethics of a mudharib in herently and cannot be known certainly by Shahibul Maal.The research was conducted on Sharia Commercial Banks in DIY and Central Java, namely BTN Syariah, Bank Syariah Mandiri, BRI Syariah. Through regression analysis, it showed that Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection effected on the contractual agency problems both individually and simultanously.

Copyrights © 2017






Journal Info

Abbrev

JABIS

Publisher

Subject

Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management

Description

Jurnal Aplikasi Bisnis (JABIS) is a journal periodical written both in Indonesian and English language. JABIS published by Diploma III Economy of Universitas Islam Indonesia twice a year on July and December. JABIS is a media of communication and reply forum for scientific works especially ...