Yuris Fahrul
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RESILIENSI DEMOKRASI FUNGSI EKUILIBRIUM, DISTRIBUSI INFORMAL, DAN EFEK SUNK COST DALAM MEKANISME PEMILIHAN LANGSUNG Yuris Fahrul
Bahasa Indonesia Vol 7 No 2 (2026): Electoral Governance: Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia
Publisher : Komisi Pemilihan Umum

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.46874/6zfkc133

Abstract

Debates on local democracy in Indonesia are often framed through normative criticism of high political costs. This article seeks to reexamine that perspective through a functional realist analysis. Electoral inefficiency is understood as a vital balancing mechanism for maintaining national stability while reshaping transactional political practices. Drawing on classical moral economy theory and recent empirical findings, this study examines the flow of campaign logistics from candidates as a form of informal redistribution that fills gaps in grassroots public services. Building on theories of oligarchy and party cartelization, the article argues that direct elections compel strategic actors to undertake massive capital investments, thereby reinforcing the sunk-cost fallacy in political decision-making. Actors burdened by astronomical political costs become materially tied to preserving state sovereignty in order to secure their political positions. Elections are further understood as a dramaturgical ritual that reinforces social cohesion, reflected in Indonesia’s improving Fragile States Index (FSI) scores. This thesis is inversely illustrated through the deviant case of the Noken System in Papua, where the absence of mass direct elections has contributed to prolonged vertical conflict. This study concludes that direct elections continue to function as an effective social safety valve for maintaining national integration.