<![CDATA[This article examines the legal provisions concerning ṭalāq (divorce) and ʿiddah (waiting period) from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, with particular emphasis on the legal distinctions between free women and female slaves in the early period of Islam, as well as their relevance in contemporary contexts. This study employs a qualitative research method with a normative-juridical approach, analyzing evidence from the Qur’an, the Prophetic traditions (ḥadīth), and the opinions of classical jurists, especially those of the Shāfiʿī school of law. The findings indicate that differences in the rulings on ṭalāq and ʿiddah were not intended as forms of discrimination, but rather were based on considerations of ḥikmah sharʿiyyah (legal wisdom), such as differences in responsibility, financial maintenance, and social conditions at the time. ʿIddah serves fundamental functions in safeguarding lineage clarity, preserving the dignity of marriage, and maintaining social stability, while ʿiddah due to death is accompanied by the obligation of iḥdād as a form of respect for the marital bond. The study further affirms that marriage contracts and proposals conducted during the ʿiddah period are legally invalid according to explicit textual evidence (naṣṣ) and scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ). In a contemporary context, the provisions of ʿiddah for female slaves are no longer applicable due to the abolition of the institution of slavery, demonstrating the flexibility of Islamic law in its application without compromising its normative principles.]]>
