Marentino Narade
Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, Indonesia

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State Conflicts of Interest: Comparative Governance of Indonesian SOEs and Singaporean GLCs Marentino Narade
Legtimacy: Journal of Law and Islamic Law Vol. 2 No. 1 (2026): Legitimacy: Journal of Law and Islamic Law
Publisher : CV. Era Digital Nusantara

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.59066/jolil.v2i1.2471

Abstract

This article examines structural dissonance in the governance of Indonesian state-owned enterprises following the enactment of Law Number 16 of 2025, which establishes the BPI Danantara superholding. Operating under a doctrinal legal methodology with a functional comparative approach against Temasek Holdings in Singapore, this study investigates the dogmatic conflict between the Business Judgment Rule and public finance law. The findings reveal that the current legislative framework creates a legal illusion of corporate autonomy. The retention of absolute veto rights through the Golden Share perpetuates political agency costs and nullifies the separate legal entity doctrine. Consequently, state corporate executives remain highly vulnerable to criminal liability under corruption laws for pure business losses. This induces a deeply systemic conservative bias. To resolve this institutional prematurity, this study urges the immediate codification of a Lex Specialis Sovereign Wealth Fund that formally ratifies the Santiago Principles, guarantees constitutional insulation, and establishes independent oversight mechanisms.
State Conflicts of Interest: Comparative Governance of Indonesian SOEs and Singaporean GLCs Marentino Narade
Legtimacy: Journal of Law and Islamic Law Vol. 2 No. 1 (2026): Legitimacy: Journal of Law and Islamic Law
Publisher : CV. Era Digital Nusantara

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.59066/jolil.v2i1.2471

Abstract

This article examines structural dissonance in the governance of Indonesian state-owned enterprises following the enactment of Law Number 16 of 2025, which establishes the BPI Danantara superholding. Operating under a doctrinal legal methodology with a functional comparative approach against Temasek Holdings in Singapore, this study investigates the dogmatic conflict between the Business Judgment Rule and public finance law. The findings reveal that the current legislative framework creates a legal illusion of corporate autonomy. The retention of absolute veto rights through the Golden Share perpetuates political agency costs and nullifies the separate legal entity doctrine. Consequently, state corporate executives remain highly vulnerable to criminal liability under corruption laws for pure business losses. This induces a deeply systemic conservative bias. To resolve this institutional prematurity, this study urges the immediate codification of a Lex Specialis Sovereign Wealth Fund that formally ratifies the Santiago Principles, guarantees constitutional insulation, and establishes independent oversight mechanisms.
Balancing Stabilization Clauses and Technology Transfer in Smart City Joint Venture Contracts Marentino Narade
Journal of State Public Policy Vol. 1 No. 3 (2026): Journal of State Public Policy
Publisher : Yayasan Cerdas Pedia Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.65101/jspp.v1i3.402

Abstract

The massive development of smart city infrastructure strategically drives developing nations to utilize foreign direct investment flows through joint venture contracts. However, the implementation of absolute stabilization clauses systematically freezes the domestic regulatory space. This study specifically aims to analyze the clash of norms between stabilization clauses and the host state's right to regulate mandatory technology transfer. The research employs a normative legal methodology using statutory and conceptual approaches rooted in the Facilitation 2.0 doctrine. The results prove that comprehensive deregulation of technology transfer instruments to increase foreign investment volume inadvertently creates long-term technological dependency for developing nations. Joint venture contracts lacking coercive regulatory protections surrender technology transfer completely to a highly asymmetric freedom of contract regime. Therefore, this research proposes a comprehensive contractual reconstruction model by inserting explicit public policy carve-outs. This legal reengineering is essential to balance commercial certainty with national digital sovereignty for sustainable smart urban governance.