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All Journal Bengkoelen Justice : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum
Deva Alfianto Supardi
Faculty of Law, University Brawijaya, Malang
Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice

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BUDGETARY INDEPENDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE NEW ERA OF NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED STATE BUDGET ALLOCATION Deva Alfianto Supardi
Bengkoelen Justice : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Vol. 16 No. 1 (2026)
Publisher : Universitas Bengkulu

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.33369/jbengkoelenjust.v16i1.48403

Abstract

The Indonesian criminal law reform through the new Criminal Code (Law Number 1 of 2023) and the new Criminal Procedure Code (Law Number 2 of 2025) necessitates a transformative overhaul of the judicial system requiring substantial financial investment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court budget merely constitutes 0.36 percent of the State Budget (APBN), significantly below the average of nations with constitutional judicial budget clauses. This study employs normative legal research methodology utilizing statutory and conceptual approaches to analyze the paradox between constitutional promises under Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution and the prevailing executive-centric budgeting reality. Quantitative data from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (2019–2023) demonstrate that the Rule of Law improved by 57 percent despite a 14.8 percent decline in government expenditure; however, Control of Corruption remained stagnant at -0.47. The findings indicate the necessity of constitutional entrenchment of judicial budget allocation at a minimum of 2 percent of the State Budget as mandatory spending. The Budget Guarantee Model comprising three pillars—mandatory spending clause, measured flexibility, and integrated oversight—is proposed as a middle-ground solution between executive capture and budgetary enclaves. Keywords: judicial budget independence; fiscal autonomy; constitutional entrenchment; Criminal Code implementation; Indonesia
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