<![CDATA[This study critically examines a systemic loophole in Indonesian Religious Courts where Western contractual formalism inadvertently legitimizes usury (riba) within Islamic economic disputes. Additionally, this study aims to propose a way out through Judicial Self-Assessment model for Indonesian Religious Courts. Employing doctrinal legal research, this study analyzes a recent Rahn Tasjily (fiduciary pawn) dispute to illustrate how judges, constrained by the procedural efficiency of the Small Claims Court (Gugatan Sederhana), rigidly apply the pacta sunt servanda doctrine. Consequently, they bypass their ex officio mandate to ensure substantive Sharia compliance. The core findings demonstrate that the judicially validated 4% daily penalty clause materially constitutes disguised Riba Nasi'ah rather than compensation for actual operational loss (Dharar al-Haqiqi). By calculating penalties proportionally to the principal debt and default duration, the court essentially sanctions the prohibited Time Value of Money. This approach facilitates risk-free capital accumulation for financial institutions and creates a systemic debt spiral for vulnerable micro-debtors. To resolve the tension between evidentiary challenges and the strict prohibition of usury, this research proposes a Judicial Self-Assessment model. By utilizing standardized court summon radius fees as an objective benchmark, judges can accurately quantify real loss. This mechanism empowers the application of the ex aequo et bono principle within strict Sharia corridors, effectively closing the judicial loophole that permits the legalization of riba.]]>
