Susila Windarta
Politeknik Siber dan Sandi Negara

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An Extended Cryptanalysis of Peyrin on SIMON-JAMBU64/96: A Study on Reduced-Tuple Attacks Susila Windarta; Wuri Handayani; Bety Hayat Susanti
CAUCHY: Jurnal Matematika Murni dan Aplikasi Vol 10, No 2 (2025): CAUCHY: JURNAL MATEMATIKA MURNI DAN APLIKASI
Publisher : Mathematics Department, Maulana Malik Ibrahim State Islamic University of Malang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.18860/cauchy.v10i2.36601

Abstract

This study evaluates and verifies the cryptanalysis of Peyrin \textit{et al.} on the SIMON-JAMBU64/96 Authenticated Encryption (AE) scheme, with the aim of extending the attack to a reduced number of tuples. We adopt both formal analysis and experimental validation, constructing collision-based distinguishers under a chosen-IV model and testing them with a decryption oracle. The main contribution is the demonstration that a distinguishing attack can be performed with just two tuples, showing that JAMBU is more vulnerable than previously assumed. We provide a detailed comparison of data complexity, where the two-tuple attack achieves a lower cost in the second phase ($4 \cdot 2^{48}$ queries) than the three-tuple attack ($6 \cdot 2^{48}$), at the expense of extra verification effort in the third phase. Overall, our results confirm that the SIMON-JAMBU64/96 scheme is susceptible to distinguishing, plaintext forgery, and plaintext-recovery attacks, thereby reaffirming and extending the findings of Peyrin \textit{et al.} to scenarios with more limited adversarial resources.
A Robustness Audit of STRIDE-Based Threat-Score Rankings in Cross-Border Payment Architectures Susila Windarta; Muhammad Yusuf Bambang Setiadji
Jurnal Informatika Dan Tekonologi Komputer (JITEK) Vol. 6 No. 2 (2026): Juli : Jurnal Informatika dan Tekonologi Komputer
Publisher : Lembaga Pengembangan Kinerja Dosen

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.55606/jitek.v6i2.12215

Abstract

Threat-score rankings produced by STRIDE models depend on system decomposition, trust labels, and numerical coding. This study audits a published ranking of correspondent banking, closed-loop, infrastructure, and peer-to-peer cross-border payment architectures. The analysis first reweights aggregate rows labeled Outside and derives exact rank-crossover points, defined as the weight values at which the priority ranking of two architectures changes. It then normalizes scores by the number of listed interaction expressions and perturbs the total weight between Inside and Outside labels by up to 10 percentage points. A seeded 100,000-run Monte Carlo experiment samples the multiplier log-uniformly on [1/3, 3] and samples feasible label shifts uniformly. In raw totals, correspondent banking ranks first with probability 0.6905, peer-to-peer with 0.2296, and infrastructure with 0.0799. After normalization, first place is restricted to correspondent banking (0.7189) or closed-loop (0.2811). Transferability is checked using an independent e-payment STRIDE dataset: the leading category changes from information disclosure under summed likelihood-impact products to elevation of privilege after per-scenario normalization. The combined findings indicate that the scoring formula is not the only factor shaping priority rankings. Aggregation choices and model granularity can also influence the rankings to a comparable extent. Since the inputs are ordinal and the simulation distributions are specified rather than empirically calibrated, the resulting outputs should be interpreted as robustness diagnostics, not as incident probabilities or operational risk estimates.